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Restrictive covenants are an increasingly common feature of employment, used
across a wide range of industries, occupations, and employees.! In its most common
form, a restrictive covenant prohibits an employee from competing with the employer
within a certain geographic area fora specified period of time after departure, usually
one or two years. Sometimes these clauses are drawn more narrowly, proscribing
specific activities such as continued dealings with former customers. Regardless of
scope, the typical remedy when an employee breaches such a covenant is injunctive
relief.
A substantial literature within law and economics debates the merits of restrictive
covenants from an efficiency perspective. A core theme of this literature is that the
central task for legal rules is to mediate competing incentives for "opportunism" by
both firm and employee.2 This focus on the concept of opportunism to explain
parties' behavior and assist in the design of legal rules is not unique to the literature
on postemployment competition. Ithas become commonplace for scholars analyzing
contracts and organizational structures to adopt the rhetoric and framework of
Williamson's "transaction cost" model." Indeed, Williamson's classic treatises on
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I. I am unaware of any empirical study directly measuring the prevalence of restrictive
covenants in practice. But see Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition
Clauses in Employment Contracts, 15 L CoRP. L. 483, 484-85 (1990) (reporting a more than
doubling of appellate decisions on restrictive covenants between the late 1960s and late 1980s
and reviewing literature suggesting that this reflects an underlying increase in the actual use
of covenants in employment contracts). For a discussion of the industries and occupations
represented in appellate litigation, see id. at 519-23.
2. A well-known example is Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and
Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (198 1).
3. Oliver Williamson famously described opportunism as "self-interest seeking with
guile." OLIVER E. WILIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONs OF CAPrAuSM: FIRMs,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 47 (1985).
4. When I use the term "transaction-cost economics," I am referring loosely to the
extensive body of scholarship growing out of Ronald Coase's early conception of the firm as
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transaction-cost economics-Markets andHierarchies and TheEconomic Institutions
of Capitalism-have each surpassed Marx's Capital to become the most frequently
cited books in the social sciences.' In spite of this popularity, I argue in this Article
that the concept of opportunism, while an intuitively attractive heuristic for analyzing
certain principal-agent relations, is also plagued by significant indeterininacies that
can limit its utility as a legal-policy device. The law of restrictive covenants is one
area in which some of the most telling obscurities of the model float to the surface.
Another reason to revisit the literature on the efficiency of restrictive covenants
relates to the rising challenge of maintaining a well-trained workforce in the current
mobile economy. According to the traditional internal labor market model, workers
acquire progressive levels of skill and training as they move up the career ladder
within a particular firm. The employer, in turn, is rewarded with a cadre of skilled,
long-term employees. In recent years, however, as we have witnessed a decline ofjob
stability and increasing mobility of labor,6 firms' traditional incentives for providing
training may have waned.' While economists and organizational theorists studying
the high-mobility economy have considered a range of options for preserving
incentives to train workers, they have not, for the most part, directed their attention
to the legal literature on restrictive covenants. Legal scholars, in turn, have until very
recently adopted traditional assumptions about labor markets when analyzing
restrictive covenants.'
a mechanism for reducing the costs of transactions. Although one could present a more refined
description of the distinctions between the "organizational failures," "property rights," and
other strains of theory within this broader rubric, that is beyond the scope of my essay. For a
general discussion of the growth and scope of ideas about the firm as a mechanism for reducing
transaction costs, see PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICs, ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT chs. 8 & 9 (1992).
5. Scott E. Masten, About Oliver E. Williamson, in FIRMS, MARKETS, AND HERARCHIES:
THE TRANSACTION COST EcONOMIcs PERSPECTIVE 37,49 (Glenn R. Carroll & David J. Teece
eds., 1999).
6. Although the patterns of change are somewhat more complicated than the text implies,
reviews of empirical studies on changes injob stability suggest that there was indeed a decline
in the 1990s. E.g., PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET-
DRIVEN WORKFORCE 133-36 (1999); David Neumark, CHANGES IN JOB STABILTY AND JOB
SECURITY: A COLLECTIVE EFFORT TO UNTANGLE, RECONCILE, AND INTERPRET THE EVIDENCE
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7472, 2000).
7. For a discussion of these changes, see CAPPELLI, supra note 6, at 4748 (arguing that
rising employee turnovei has reduced employers' incentives to invest in training employees).
8. Recent inroads into analyzing trade secrets and restrictive covenants in the high-
mobility, high-technology economy include ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY:
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (forthcoming 2002);
Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon
Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575, 608-09 (1999)
(explaining Silicon Valley's success compared to Massachusetts's Route 128 as resulting from
California's legal prohibition on restrictive covenants); Alan Hyde, Silicon Valley's High-
Velocity Labor Market, I 1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 28, 28-29 (1998) [hereinafter Hyde, High-
Velocity]; Christine M. O'Malley, Covenants Not to Compete in the Massachusetts High-Tech
Industry: Assessing the Need for a Legislative Solution, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1215 (1999)
(advocating Massachusetts's adoption of a statute modeled after Colorado law); Hanna Bui-
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Thus, while my Article focuses principally on the utility of transaction-cost
economic models in the context of restrictive covenants, I also try to advance at least
some preliminary thoughts on how the law of restrictive covenants may bear on the
challenge of training the workforce of the future.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes why restrictive
covenants may be useful where other mechanisms for protecting employer
investments fail. Part II discusses judicial approaches to enforcement of restrictive
covenants, exposing the puzzling tendency of courts to enforce restrictive covenants
where they protect employer investments in trade secrets, confidential information,
or customer relations, but not where theyprotect an employer's investment in training
employees in the "general tools of the trade." In Part IV, I discuss economic analyses
of the law in this area, expanding on the significance of transaction-cost economics
as a theoretical centerpiece. In Part V, I critique these analyses, arguing that
deploying the concept of bilateral opportunism to either defend or prescribe a legal
rule for enforcing restrictive covenants is more elusive than those who invoke the
techniques may acknowledge. I conclude with some speculations as to how legal
scholars might steer clear, or at least avoid the worst perils, of this conceptual thicket.
II. THE ROLE OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Perhaps the most logical way to begin my inquiry is to ask why an employer would
want a restrictive covenant to begin with. While there may be a number of answers
to this question, the most prevalent concerns the protection of a specific investment.
An employer may wish to reveal business secrets to employees, or introduce
employees to clients it has cultivated, yet fear that doing so would be risky should the
employees depart and try to exploit the information. In order to protect such an
investment, the argument goes, the employer will require employees to promise not
to compete in the event of departure.
Of course, the employer could attempt to use a number of extra-legal mechanisms
in lieu of a restrictive covenant to protect itself from possible leakage of business
secrets. Each of these alternatives, though, has notable limitations.
For example, requiring employees to pay for access to the information itself
through reduced wages is likely to be thwarted by liquidity problems. Certaifly, an
employee maybe willing to purchase the information, expecting the investment to pay
dividends in the form of professional advancement and a share of returns to projects
involving the secrets. Yet even the most motivated employee maybe unable to do so,
because a single secret, even one that is easy to learn, may be worth hundreds of
thousands of dollars.9 The use of "golden handcuffs," that is, paying an employee to
Eve, Note, To Hire orNot to Hire: What Silicon Valley Companies Should KnowAbout Hiring
Competitors' Employees, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 981, 1001-02 (1997) (summarizing California
statutory and decisional law on noncompetition agreements); and Alan Hyde, The Wealth of
Shared Information: Silicon Valley's High-Velocity Labor Market, Endogenous Economic
Growth, and the Law of Trade Secrets, at http://www.andromeda.rutgers.edu/-hyde (Sept.
1998) [hereinafter Hyde, Wealth] (explaining Silicon Valley's comparative success in terms
of both the prohibition on covenants not to compete and the reluctance of California firms to
bring trade secrets lawsuits).
9. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics ofRights in Valuable Information, 9
2001]
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stay with the firm, is frequently not a viable solution either: it would be necessary to
pay the employee enough to make him indifferent between exploiting the information
elsewhere and staying-an amount that would often eliminate the profitability of the
information entirely.'0 Moreover, if multiple employees are privy to the secret, the
sum of the bribes required to retain each employee may very well exceed the value
of the secret to the original employer." A third alternative is modifying the
production process to make the information more difficult to appropriate, for
example, fragmenting production so that no one employee knows all of the essential
steps. Here however, the costs of balkanization are obvious, and the resulting losses
of production efficiency may very well outweigh any gains arising from protection
of information.
Finally, an alternative to these extra-legal mechanisms is enforcement of property
(or perhaps tort)'" rights embodied in the law of trade secrets. The majority of states
have now adopted the 1985 Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTA"), 3 which defines a
trade secret as
information ... that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or
use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy.'
4
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition follows the UTA, adopting a very
similar definition and the posture that any misappropriation of a trade secret may be
enjoined.Is
J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 708 (1980).
10. Sometimes golden handcuffs take the form of stock options that vest only after the
employee has been with the company for a minimum period. These deferred compensation
schemes might also be unreliable retention devices for different reasons. See CAPPELUi, supra
note 6, at 185-86 (discussing the examples ofIBM, in which some employees' incentives to
stay collapsed with a collapse in the stock price in the early 1990s, and the converse example
of Microsoft, where booming stock prices in the late 1990s led some key employees whose
stock options had vested to cash in their stock options and form start-ups).
11. Kitch, supra note 9, at 709.
12. The question of whether trade secret law is a species of property or tort has given rise
to some debate. See Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets and Restrictive
Covenants in Employment and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800-1920, 52
HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 200 1) (manuscript at 74 n.277, on file with author) (discussing this
point of ambiguity).
13. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
14. Id. § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 438.
15. RESTATEMENT(THCRD) OFUNFAIRCOMPETITION §44 (1995). Section 39 defines a trade
secret as "any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise
and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage
over others." Id. at § 39. This UTA-compatible definition is an expansion of the previous
definition that appeared in the first Restatement of Torts, in that it eliminates the distinction
drawn in the Restatement of Torts between trade secrets and other confidential information that
has economic value. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). For a discussion of this
expansion of trade secret law, see Edmund W. Kitch, The Expansion of Trade Secrecy
[Vol. 76:49
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Trade secret law, however, does not completely allay employer concerns. For
example, the employer may never discover the misappropriation or competitive use
of a trade secret by an erstwhile employee.' 6 Further, even if the employer discovers
misappropriation and pursues legal redress, additional leaks of the confidential
information arepossible in the course of legal proceedings. Finally, an employer may
be unpertain as to whether valuable information will satisfy the definition of a trade
secret forpurposes of legal protection. For example, while confidential customer lists
maybe considered trade secrets, otherkinds of customer relations are not. A medical
clinic that makes various investments (providing infrastructure, hiring support
personnel) to assist employee physicians in developing clients faces the risk of
departure by physicians once they have enough patients to sustain an independent
practice. If the identity of the clients is nonconfidential, trade secret law may offer
little comfort.
Restrictive covenants, then, fill a gap where other legal and extra-legal mechanisms
fall short. Ideally, a contract enables the employer to keep former employees away
from competitors (or direct competition) in the first place.)' Thus, while not the only
way to protect business secrets and customer relations, restrictive covenants may be
preferable to the alternatives.'" One might ask, why use a restrictive covenant, rather
than a long-term contract binding the worker to the firm? The answer stems at least
partly from the historical resistance of courts to enforce long-term contracts on
grounds of public policy, or, in the United States, the Thirteenth Amendment. 9 So
long as it is not inordinately broad, a restrictive covenant does not force the worker
to serve her employer; it merely prevents her from putting her labor to a particular set
of uses, for a particular period of time, postdeparture.
Protection and the Mobility ofManagement Employees: A New Problem for the Law, 47 S.C.
L. REv. 659, 659-64 (1996).
16. The problem of low probability of detection is compounded by the fact that it would
be difficult (for liquidity reasons) to magnify the size of the sanction to a sufficient level that
elicits deterrence equivalent to that of an enforceable restrictive covenant.
17. Kitch, supra note 9, at 690-91; see also Rubin & Shedd, supra note 2, at 105 (arguing
use of contractual mechanisms may be a pragmatic response to the difficulty of knowing ex
ante whether information will be deemed a trade secret).
18. I should note here that the question ofwhether the enforcement ofrestrictive covenants
is the optimal way to encourage innovation is not uncontroversial. See Gilson, supra note 8,
at 608-09; Hyde, High-Velocity supra note 8, at 33; see also Kitch, supra note 9, at 722-23
(speculating that courts may be hostile to restrictive covenants because such restrictions
inefficiently reduce the depth and continuity of the labor market); infra text accompanying
notes 111-13.
19. Beverly Glen Music, Inc. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 224 Cal. Rptr. 260, 261
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding judicial compulsion of personal services would violate the
Thirteenth Amendment); ABC, Inc. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 366 (N.Y. 1981) (same). The
enforceability problem due to involuntary servitude, however, is salient onlywhere the contract
requires specific performance. Traditional analysis does not speak to the reasons why parties
could not enter into long-term contracts enforceable through damages. I will take as given the
difficulties in enforcing long-term contracts for purposes of this Article (although I recognize
that this position may be debatable in itself).
2001]
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III. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
As a presumptive matter, contracts restricting postemployment employee mobility
are unenforceable at common law.2" Behind this presumption lurks a peculiarly
resilient commitment to the notion that a worker should have the liberty to ply his
general tools of the trade, unfettered by contractual or other restraints.2 The
foundations of this commitment are the twin assumptions that restrictive covenants
are the product of unequal bargaining power between the Iarties,2 and that they
interfere with market competition. ' Exceptions to the rule arise only where a
covenant protects a "legitimate interest" of the employer and is not "unreasonable"
in its scope.
Legitimate or protectible employer interests include trade secrets and confidential
know-how, as well as some kinds of customer relations.24 Trade secrets are the least
20. For histories of the common law on covenants not to compete, see Harlan M. Blake,
EmployeeAgreementsNot to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625,625-46 (1960); Fisk, supra note
12. See also Benjamin Aaron & Matthew W. Finkin, The Law of Employee Loyalty in the
United States, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 321 (1999) (situating the law of restrictive
covenants within the broader legal realm of employee loyalty).
A minority of states, such as California, simply deem restrictive covenants unenforceable
by statute, though these statutes usually contain narrow exceptions. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§16600-16602.5 (West 1997) (exceptions include covenants attached to sale of goodwill of
a business or upon dissolution of partnership or limited liability corporation); see also ALA.
CODE § 8-1-1 (1993); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113 (West 1994); HAw. REV. STAT. §
480-4(c) (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 23:921 (West 1998); MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 28-2-703,
-704 (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-4 (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1987); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 217 (West 1999).
21. Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 127 N.E.2d 235,240 (Ind. 1955) ("Knowledge, skill
and information (except trade secrets and confidential information) become a part of the
employee's personal equipment.... These things cannot be taken from him, although he may
forget or abandon them." (citing Jewel Tea Co. v. Grissman, 279 N.W. 544,545 (S.D. 1938)));
Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strausman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976) (stating that "no
restrictions should fetter an employee's right to his own best advantage the skills and
knowledge acquired bythe overall experience ofhis previous employment'). Note that to make
the review of doctrine more manageable, I focus mainly on the (fairly typical) laws of Illinois,
New York, and Indiana.
22. A famous articulation of this rationale for the rule appears in Arthur Murray Dance
Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 703-04 (Ohio C.P. 1952) (stating that an "[employee's]
individual bargaining power is seldom equal to that of his employer"). See also RESTATtMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §188 cmt. g ("Post-employment restraints are scrutinized with
particular care because they are often the product of unequal bargaining power .... ").
23. Gillespie v. Carbondale and Marion Eye Ctrs., Ltd., 622 N.E.2d 1267, 1269 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1993) ("Because Illinois courts abhor restraints on trade and encourage fair competition,
restrictive covenants in employment contracts are carefully scrutinized."); Hahn v. Drees,
Peruguni & Co., 581 N.E.2d 457,459 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) ("Covenants... are not favored
in the law because they are in restraint of trade."); Reed, Roberts Assocs., 353 N.E.2d at 593
(explaining judicial disfavor of covenants partly because "our economy is premised on the
competition engendered by the uninhibited flow of services, talent, and ideas").
24. This list is not fully inclusive. Restrictive covenants might also, for example, permit an
employer to prevent a unique employee, such as an athlete or artist, from departing after the
[Vol. 76:49
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controversial protectible interest.' A typical restrictive covenant held enforceable on
this basis is a prohibition on a former employee's use of a confidential customer list
(that itself is a trade secret) after departure.' Sometimes, as in the case of customer
relationships, evidence of significant employer investment alone, even absent trade
secrets, suffices.27 But for these latter kinds of protectible interests, vendor-client
relations tend towards exclusivity. A common example of protectible customer
relationships is the client base a professional develops through her affiliation with a
professional practice group.28 In contrast, where customers of a business that sells a
employer has made an investment in promoting the unique employee's talents. See generally
Margaret N. Kniffin, Employee Noncompetition Covenants: The Perils ofPerforming Unique'
Services, 10 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J 25,36-52 (1978) (reviewing doctrine on restraints enforceable
on basis of employee uniqueness).
25. Geritex Corp. v. Dermarite Indus., L.L.C., 910 F. Supp. 955, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(stating protectible employer interests include trade secrets and confidential customer lists);
Ackerman v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 778,781-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (stating courts
will enforce a covenant to protect trade secrets, so long as it meets other requirements of
enforceability), vacated in part, adopted in part, 652 N.E.2d 507 (Ind. 1995). This is so even
in some states, such as California, that statutorily prohibit covenants not to compete. See e.g.,
Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836, 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that use of former
employer's confidential information to lure customers away could be legally restricted despite
state statute prohibiting covenants not to compete because nondisclosure agreement is legally
distinct from covenant not to compete). But cf Gilson, supra note 8, at 607-08 (failing to locate
case law that specifically upheld a covenant not to compete because it protected underlying
trade secrets).
26. Ivy Mar Co. v. C.R. Seasons Ltd., 907 F. Supp. 547,556-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding
customer list protectible as a trade secret when the names on the list could not be readily
ascertainable, and developing the list entailed great employer effort or expenditure).
27. See, e.g., Label Printers v. Pflug, 564 N.E.2d 1382, 1387 (Il. Ct. App. 1991) (finding
protectible interest where employer has "near-permanent" relationship with customers with
whom, but for the employment, employee would not have encountered; "near-permanence" is
a function of, inter alia, time, cost, and difficulty of developing and maintaining clientele, as
well as continuity and duration of relationship (citing Reinhardt Printing Co. v. Feld, 490
N.E.2d 1302 (I11. Ct. App. 1986))); Hahn, 581 N.E.2d at 460 (finding protectible good will
includes right to restrict former employee from enticing away old customers (citing Donahue
v. Permacel Tape Corp., 127 N.E.2d 235,241 (Ind. 1955))). Edmund Kitch, in a recent article,
notes that with the advent of the UTA and subsequent expansion of the definition of trade
secrets, some cases in which the interest protected by a restrictive covenant formerly was seen
to extend beyond trade secrets might now fit within the definition of trade secrets. Kitch, supra
note 9, at 665.
28. See Cockerill v. Wilson, 281 N.E.2d 648, 651 (11. 1972) (veterinarian); Canfield v.
Spear, 254 N.E.2d 433,434 (111. 1969) (physician); Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr. v. Perket,
605 N.E.2d 613, 617 (111. Ct. App. 1993) (stating "near-permanence" of employer relationship
with patients, and thus protectibility of interest in patients, is inherent in the medical
professional and veterinary context); Gelder Medical Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 577
(N.Y. 1977) (physician); Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751, 755-56 (N.Y. 1971) (oral
surgeon); Zellner v. Stephen D. Conrad, M.D., P.C., 589 N.Y.S.2d 903, 905-06 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1992) (holding opthamologist's clients a protectible interest of former employer-clinic).
But see the recent decision of the Second Circuit under New York law in Ticor Title Ins. Co.
v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1999), affirming the lower court's decision to recognize an
2001]
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nonunique product also do business with rival firms, or where the identity of
customers is readily available through a publicly available directory, there is no
protectible interest"
Even assuming a legitimate employer interest, only reasonable restrictions will be
enforced. Reasonableness, purportedly a question of law, typically turns on the
weighing of various factors, including hardship to the employee (which takes into
account inequality of bargaining power), effect on the public interest (which takes
into account anticompetitive effects), and the imperative that the restriction be no
greater than necessary to protect the interests of the employer in terms of time,
geography, and activity.3" The bite of the reasonableness analysis rests principally in
the latter factors, pertaining to the scope of the restrictions: a restraint deemed
reasonable in scope typically will not be invalidated due to public interest or hardship
alone. Conversely, a restraint found to violate public interest or hardship concerns
virtually always also contains unreasonable time, geography, or activity constraints."
As with most standard-like doctrines, there are no hard and fast rules about the
reasonable scope of restrictions. Typical judicial guidance on duration is the truism
that it ought not extend beyond what is necessary to protect the employer's interests.32
As for geography, courts focus on whether the restraint exceeds the geographic area
or territory in which the employee formerly worked,33 or where the employer
insurance company's protectible interest in a salesman's relationships with clients whose
identities were widely known in the highly competitive business of selling real estate title
insurance. Id. at 71. In what is arguably an expansion of the spirit if not the letter of New York
precedent, the court held that the salesman's client relationships were protectible as unique
services, a classification that in the past had been reserved for the services of employees such
as acrobats and corporate officers, rather than salespersons. Id. at 72.
29. Ivy Mar, 907 F. Supp. at 558; Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Mileham, 620
N.E.2d 479, 485 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
30. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 188(1)(a), (b), & cmts. b, c, & d (1981). The
seminal holding on the enforceability of reasonable restraints remains the eighteenth-century
English decision ofMitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711) (establishing restraints
on competition presumptively unenforceable, though presumption may be rebutted if restraint
is reasonable). See also, e.g., Ivy Mar, 907 F. Supp. at 558-59 (reviewing the general factors
that influence reasonableness); Abbott-Interfast Corp. v. Harkabus, 619 N.E.2d 1337, 1340-41
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 127 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ind. 1955);
Waterfield Mortgage Co. v. O'Connor, 361 N.E.2d 924, 926-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); Mallory
Factor, Inc. v. Schwartz, 536 N.Y.S.2d 752, 753 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
31. Blake, supra note 20, at 686-87; Milton Handler & Daniel E. Lazaroff, Restraint of
Trade and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 669, 731-49 (1982);
Whitmore, supra note 1, at 508-19.
32. House of Vision, Inc. v. Hiyane, 225 N.E.2d 21, 25 (III. 1967); Schmidl v. Central
Laundry & Supply Co., 13 N.Y.S.2d 817, 824 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1939).
33. Donahue, 127 N.E.2d at 241 (holding that a restriction on competition in the United
States and Canada was overbroad where an employee's former responsibilities in
manufacturing and selling adhesive tape had been limited to northern Indiana); Commercial
Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 516 N.E.2d 110, 114-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
covenant restricting employee from competing instate, where employee had previouslyworked
only in northern Indiana, overbroad).
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conducted its business.34 Some restraints are invalidated because they restrict an
unreasonably broad range of vocational activities,35 although more tailored restraints
that simply prevent the employee from dealing with former customers maybe deemed
reasonable.36 In some cases, a court will "blue pencil" a covenant that protects a
legitimate interest but is unreasonable in its scope, narrowing the scope of the
injunction accordingly.37
Before moving to critique; let me emphasize what is most striking about the
doctrine I have just described. Recall the typical range of legitimate interests: trade
secrets, confidential know-how, and certain kinds of customer relations. Courts have
been exceedingly reluctant to protect employer investments in training per se. Even
where an employer can demonstrate costly training expenditures, a court is unlikely
to enforce a covenant to protect them absent the additional presence of trade secrets,
confidential information, or protectible client relationships. Thus an employer's
costly investment in training an employee to authenticate rare coins was deemed by
an Illinois court to be mere instruction in the trade, rather than a protectible interest.3"
Still another employer, this time fromIndiana, was powerless to enforce an agreement
signed by an employee it had trained to polish orthopedic products, even though the
contract expressly required the employee to reimburse the employer for training
expenses according to a specified price schedule should he decide to leave for a
34. Ebbeskotte v. Tyler, 142 N.E.2d 905, 909 (Ind. Ct. App. 1957) (discussing restrictive
covenant limited to city and vicinity where former employer operated business); NCR Corp.
v. Rotondi, 450 N.Y.S.2d 198, 199 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
35. Norlund v. Faust, 675 N.E.2d 1142,1155 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (holding opthamologist
could enjoin former employee optometrist from contacting optometrists who referred patients
to former employer, but could not enjoin former employee from acting as an optometrist in
association with any opthamologist within specified counties, because the latter would prevent
him from practicing his livelihood); Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751, 754 (N.Y. 1971)
(holding covenant preventing oral surgeon from practicing dentistry in a particular territory for
a particular period following departure from oral surgery practice overbroad because it
extended beyond oral surgery).
36. E.g., Schmidl, 13 N.Y.S.2d at 824 (granting employer injunction enforcing restrictive
covenant that prohibited employee from soliciting, for nine months postdeparture, any clients
he brought to former employer's business).
37. Total Health Physicians v. Barrientos, 502 N.E.2d 1240, 1242-43 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(limiting the geographic area of an overbroad covenant to an area that is reasonable); Akhter
v. Shah, 456 N.E.2d 232, 235 (l1. App. Ct. 1983); Consumers' Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 41
N.E. 1048, 1051 (Ind. 1895); Young v. Van Zandt, 449 N.E.2d 300,304 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983);
Career Placement of White Plains, Inc. v. Vaus, 354 N.Y.S.2d 764, 773 (N.Y. Gen. Term
1974); Schmidl, 13 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
Earlier cases required that acovenant be clearly divisible before severance was permissible,
but this requirement has softened over time in many jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d 667, 683 (S.D. Ind. 1998); Hahn v.
Drees, Perugini & Co., 581 N.E.2d 457,462 (nd. Ct. App. 1991) (holding where contract is
divisible, and where it will not lead to the addition of any new terms, court may "blue pencil"
unreasonable provisions to make the contract reasonable as a whole); B.D.O. Seidman v.
Hirschberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382,395 (N.Y. 1999).
38. Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. Mileham, 620 N.E.2d 479,486 (ill. App. Ct. 1993).
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competitor.39
The exceptions to this reluctance are few and narrow. While some jurisdictions do
explicitly recognize training expenses as protectible at common law,40 even in these
jurisdictions courts have been conservative in their approach.4 Florida, Louisiana,
and Colorado have attempted to protect investments in training by statute. 42 These
attempts, too, have been ill-fated,43 or often narrowly construed.4 Courts have been
39. Brunner v. Hand Indus., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 157, 160-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
an agreement unenforceable because it restrained an employee's use of "general training and
skills").
40. E.g., Beckman v. Cox Broadcasting Corp., 296 S.E.2d 566, 568 (Ga. 1982) (holding
employer may legitimately protect investment in time and money in developing employee's
skills); see also Milwaukee Area Joint Apprenticeship Training Comm. for the Elec. Indus. v.
Howell, 67 F.3d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding loan agreement obligating electrician to
repay cost oftraining tojoint union-multiemployer training-apprenticeship trust fund if he went
to work for a noncontributing employer within the industry was not a restrictive covenant
because it did not enjoin competition generally, only recoupment of training costs in the event
of accepting employment with certain competitors); Borg-Warner Prot. Servs. Corp. v.
Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 495, 500-02 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (applying both Tennessee and
Kentucky law to find security contractor's investment in training security guards on-the-job to
satisfy needs of hiring firm was a legitimate basis for enforcing covenant that prohibited
employees from working for successor contractor); Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 565
N.E.2d 540,544 (Ohio 1991) (holding employer investment in time and money for equipment,
facilities, support staff, and training is protectible interest); Atlantic Tool & Die v. Kacic, No.
2717-M, 1998 WL 801913, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 18, 1998) (holding protectible interest
arose out of costly and specialized-but not confidential-training conferred on employee in
the area of tool and die manufacturing quality control).
41. See, e.g., Brunswick Floors, Inc. v. Guest, 506 S.E.2d 670, 673 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that although investment in extensive training may be protectible interest, sending
employee from Brunswick, Georgia, to Kansas City for all-expense-paid training program in
advanced carpet installation, and to Atlanta for certification course in floor installation, was
insufficient investment in training to uphold covenant not to compete within eighty-mile radius
for two years).
42. CoLo. REv. ANN. STAT. § 8-2-113(2)(c) (West 1994) (permissible to have covenant that
provides for recovery of expense of educating and training an employee who has served an
employer foraperiod of less than two years); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(l)(b)(5) (West 1985)
("extraordinary or specialized training" is a legitimate business interest); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:921 (West 1998) (legitimate employer interests include training and advertising).
43. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 23:92 1, which included among protectible interests
employer investments in training and advertising, was amended in 1989 to eliminate the special
exception for training and advertising.
44. E.g., Dyer v. Pioneer Concepts, Inc., 667. So. 2d 961, 964 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding employee trained in stripping floors and operating equipment leased to grocery stores,
and enrolled in seminars on interpersonal skills, hiring and firing employees, and repairing
equipment, did not have extraordinary training pursuant to definition of legitimate business
interest); Hapney v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127,132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
in order to be "extraordinary," training must exceed "what is usual, regular, common, or
customary in the industry in which the employee is employed"; employer's investment in
extending air-conditioning installer and repairer's skills to include cruise-control units and
cellular telephones not extraordinary); see also Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 302 So. 2d
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more willing to enforce contracts that require an employee to reimburse discrete
training costs, rather than refrain from competing,4 though even this type of
agreement is vulnerable to judicial invalidation on public-policy grounds.' In sum,
to the extent protection of employer investments in nonconfidential human capital is
desirable, common law and statutory inroads are at best narrow, and at worst, leave
employers uncertain and perhaps unwilling to provide some types of training to
employees. Economic logic plays no explicit role in the distinction drawn by the
doctrine. Yet, as I will discuss shortly, numerous scholars have argued that there are
compelling reasons to enforce restrictive covenants thatprotect employer investments
in training per se.
IV. CRmQUE AND ANALYSIS
A. Review ofLiterature on Restrictive Covenants
The question whether restrictive covenants ought to be enforced at all-and if so,
when-sharply divides commentators. Some legal scholars advance noneconomic
justifications for their positions, coming out on both sides of the enforcement
question. Normative attacks on courts' reluctance to enforce postemployment
restraints grounded in antipatemalist47 and egalitarian4 rationales are countered by
fairness based arguments against enforcement.49  Economics influenced
commentators, with a few noteworthy exceptions, 0 have generally criticized the
593,597 (La. 1974) (holding on-the-job training such as employee sales and training meetings,
and training courses in the administrative needs of the employer itself, cannot be considered
the sort of training that is protectible pursuant to (former) Louisiana Revised Statutes section
23:921, which requires investment in "substantial" sums for "special" training or extensive
advertising of the employee); Educ. for Living Seminars, Inc. v. Leone, 558 So. 2d 250,254
(La. Ct. App. 1990) (holding restrictive covenant unenforceable despite employer outlay of
$7900 in tuition for course related to employment, because money not spent on "special
training," but instead on advanced skills in an area-leading seminars-where employee was
already skilled).
45. See AnthonyW. Kraus, RepaymentAgreementsforEmployee Training Costs, 44 LAB.
LJ. 49,50-52 (1993) (reviewing cases in which courts have enforced training-cost repayment
agreements).
46. See Brunner v. Hand Indus., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 157, 160-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
47. See Christopher T. Wonnell, The Contractual Disempowerment of Employees, 46
STAN. L. REv. 87, 108-10 (describing how employees' inability to commit themselves to
employer for someperiod into the future disempowers employees because it makes employers
either unwilling to hire them or willing to hire them only at a depressed wage).
48. See Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation ofHuman Capital, 79 VA. L. REv. 383,
454-56 (1993) (arguing that the inalienability of human capital is inegalitarian because the
young and the talented are its principal beneficiaries).
49. E.g., Phillip J. Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current
Judicial Enforcement ofEmployee Covenants Not to Compete--a Proposal for Reform, 57 S.
CAL L. REV. 531, 548-49 (1984).
50. See supra note 6; see also Harvey J. Goldschmid, Antitrust's Neglected Stepchild: A
Proposal for Dealing with Restrictive Covenants Under Federal Law, 73 CoLUM. L. REv.
1193, 1204-07 (arguing restrictive covenants give employers too much control over
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narrowness of enforcement, arguing that the scope of contractually protectible
interests should not exclude pure investments in training." To the extent that at least
part of the rationale for limiting enforceability of covenantsis a nonconsequentialist
claim that a worker has an inalienable and unconditional right to ownership of his
own labor, the critics' position reveals their belief that labor is as susceptible as other
commodities to this kind of contractual commitment. Consequently, they maintain,
a legally enforceable commitment device is essential to induce efficient investments
in training and innovation.
Economists are frequently dubious of arguments that deeminequality ofbargaining
power to be a transaction cost justifying "market-correcting" regulatory or judicial
intervention. 2 The academic literature on restrictive covenants is no exception.
Numerous commentators have argued that while duress and unconscionability are
legitimate bases for invalidating restrictive covenants,judicial concern for inequality
of bargaining power per se is deeply problematic. 3 To begin with, they argue, if
competition within their industry, and they should therefore be subject to federal antitrust
laws); Rubin & Shedd, supra note 2; Charles A. Sullivan, Revisiting the "Neglected
Stepchild": An Antitrust Treatment ofPostemployment Restraints of Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L. F.
621,647-50 (arguing courts should expand the applicability of antitrust law to examine more
explicitly the market impact of postemployment restraints on trade).
51. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE: A LEGAL
AND ECONOMIc ANALYSIS 120-23 (1986); Maureen Callahan, Comment, Post-Employment
RestraintAgreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 703,715,718 (1985); YorkMoody
Faulkner, Comment, A Market Analysis ofAnticompetition Agreements in Labor Contracts,
1991 BYU L. REv. 1657, 1675-76 (1991).
52. See e.g., Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual
Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 356, 360-61 (1980) (stating contracts facially appearing
one-sided may contain a counterweight in the form of implicit, or reputationally driven, checks
on opportunistic behavior); Stewart J. Schwab, The Law and Economics Approach to
Workplace Regulation, inGOVERNMENTREGULATIONOFTHEEMPLOYMENTRELAnONSHIP 91,
111-13 (Bruce E. Kaufinan ed., 1997) (stating numerous forms of transaction costs mayjustify
intervention, but inequality of bargaining power iA not one of them); Michael L. Wachter &
Randall D. Wright, The Economics of Internal Labor Markets, 29 INDUS. REL 240, 254-55
(1990) (arguing that despite certain efficiency justifications for unions, defending inalienable
entitlements under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") in the name of failures of
bargaining power, while perhaps sensible in the 1930s, seems strained today). But see Michael
H. Gottesman, Wither GoestLaborLaw: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100 YALEL.J.
2767, 2787 (1991) (reviewing PAUL C. WEMER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990)), who argues that the characterization of the
employment relation as a bilateral monopoly collapses if one party is more powerful than the
other. Assuming the existence of surplus due to asset specificity, one party may be able to
extract more of the surplus than the other, effectively rendering the relationship a simple, rather
than bilateral, monopoly. Id. If the more powerful party is the firm, it may find it privately
rational to pay a wage below that which will elicit maximal productivity from workers (because
the surplus captured may exceed the returns from paying higher wages). Id. This outcome,
argues Gottesman, may be suboptimal from a societal standpoint and mayjustify laws such as
the NLRA that are designed to equalize bargaining power between parties. Id.
53. See, e.g., TREBILCOCK, supra note 51, at 135-39, 143 (expressing skepticism that
employer monopsony power, if it existed, would manifest itself in a restrictive covenant
disadvantageous to the employee); Callahan, supra note 51, at 715-23 (asserting that many
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bargaining power is indeed important, then its invocation is inconsistent: while
paying lip service to policing inequality ofbargaining power, judges routinely analyze
covenants alone, paying scant attentionto the actualbargainingpower ofthe parties.'
Moreover, they contend, bargaining power itself is a limited concept in a broader
market context. Absent severely constrained competition (for example, monopsony
conditions), wages will tend to reflect the opportunity costs of any future restrictions
on mobility. Judicial hostility to the "anticompetitive" effects of covenants is greeted
with similar skepticism among most economist observers, who stress that unless the
employer has a monopoly or market dominance more generally, its power to restrain
an employee from competing will only trivially affect market competition."
The upshot is that critics are unpersuaded by the existing limitations on the range
ofprotectible interests. Instead, they would expand the field to include pure training
investments. In addition, some critics are also predictably unsentimental about the
doctrine's reasonableness jurisprudence which, as discussed earlier, invokes
inequality ofbargaining power and anticompetitive effects in assessing whether, even
assuming a protectible interest, a covenant overreaches in terms of time, geography,
or vocation.' To this end, some reformers would eliminate the reasonableness test
altogether, enforcing restrictive covenants according to the conventional rules of
contract.' Traditional contract analysis, they say, leaves room to scrutinize process
defects during contract formation. The doctrines of duress, unconsionability, and so
on are sufficient bases on which to evaluate the soundness of an agreement. Other
critics would save the reasonableness test in one form or another, satisfied simply to
broaden the scope of legitimate interests to include training.58
employees who sign postemployment restraints are likely to be inventors who possess
considerable bargaining power); Kitch, supra note 9, at 686-88 (stating that courts do not
distinguish between sophisticated and unsophisticated employees, making the bargaining power
criterion suspect; moreover, parties can always renegotiate); Sterk, supra note 48, at 406-08
(arguing that the anticompetitive effect of restrictive covenants will be insignificant); William
H. White, "Common Callings" and the Enforcement ofPostemployment Covenants in Texas,
19 ST. MARY's L.J. 589, 596-98 (1988) (arguing that duress and unconscionability are valid
mechanisms for protecting employees from restrictive covenants, but a covenant cannot be
invalidated simply because unequal bargaining power exists).
54. See Callahan, supra note 51, at 721-22.
55. TREBILCOCK, supra note 51, at 147; Callahan, supra note 51, at 714-15. Callahan
further argues that even if the employer did have market dominance, allowing it to enforce
postemployment restraints would not imply that the agreement was anticompetitive. Any costs
resulting from allowing a dominant market player to prolong its dominance by eliminating
competitors would be offset by gains resulting from encouragement of investment in research
and training. Id. at 715.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 30-37.
57. E.g., Callahan, supra note 51, at 725-27.
58. See, e.g., Faulkner, supra note 51, at 1677-78. Faulkner advocates a two-part test in
which the court assesses whether, at the time of contracting, the market was competitive and
the employee had full information: judged, respectively, by whether the employee was qualified
for other acceptable jobs, and whether a reasonable person similarly situated would have
entered into the anticompetition agreement at the same wage. Id. Although the author does not
label it as such, this proposed test is functionally similar to the test for unconscionability, which
itself may take into account monopoly power and information asymmetry in assessing
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I stated in the introduction that my particular interest is the invocation of
transaction-cost economics, in particular, the concept of opportunism, to analyze the
efficiency of the common law of restrictive covenants. The application of this model,
I will argue, at once raises the analysis to a higher level of sophistication, and
introduces the new hazards for legal scholars and reformers. It is to that literature I
now turn.
B. Transaction-Cost Economic Analysis
The paradigmatic startingpoint for transaction cost analysis ofrestrictive covenants
is GaryBecker's 1964 treatise onhuman capital, which distinguishes between general
and specific training. 9 General training is equally valuable across firms.' An
example is the training a medical intern receives at a hospital. For the worker, general
training represents a valuable asset and he should be willing to pay for it in the form
of reduced wages. But some workers will find it difficult to refuse jobs offering
higher wages from the outset, even if the quid pro quo is less training and
consequently lower prospects for long-term career advancement." In order to attract
applicants, firms that offer extensive general training may defer recouping their
investment by reducing the worker's compensation only after providing some or all
of the training.
The problem with this arrangement is that the worker may be tempted during the
"pay-back" period-when he is receiving a wage below his marginal product-to act
opportunistically. The worker may "hold up" the employer by demanding a higher
wage under threat of defecting to a competitor who offers a higher wage. Restrictive
covenants might reduce this temptation bypreventing the employee from working for
competitors for some specified period following separation."2 To take a simple
stylized example, suppose TrainCo hires Alice, offering a salary of $30,000 per year
for the first two years. During year one, TrainCo spends $5000 on training programs
procedural fairness. In contrast to the usual application ofunconscionability doctrine, however,
the author recommends reformation, rather than invalidation, of covenants that fail the test. Id.
59. GARY S. BECKER, HuMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIs WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 40 (3d ed. 1993). See also the classic article by Jacob
Mincer, On-the-Job Training: Costs, Returns, and Some Implications, 70 J. PoL ECON. 50
(1962). Human capital is the investment, embodied in a person, in human resources expected
to improve productivity. It includes schooling, on-the-job experience, and skills training. See
BECKER, supra, at 29-58 (describing the various types ofhuman capital). The discussion herein
focuses almost exclusively on on-the-job experience and training.
60. See BECKER, supra note 59, at 33-40 (describing the ideas summarized in this
paragraph).
61. Federal law makes this more difficult at the low end of the wage scale. The Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 206(g) (Supp. IV 1998), permits explicitly reduced
"training wages" in only a limited range of circumstances. For example, employers are
permitted to pay employees under the age of twenty an "opportunity wage," that is, a wage of
$4.25 per hour (which is below the federal minimum wage) for the first ninety days of
employment. Id. § 206(g)(1). The FLSA similarly permits below-minimum wages for learners,
apprentices, and messengers, but only under certain limited circumstances specified in the
regulations. Id. § 214(a) (1994).
62. See, e.g., Blake, supra note 20, at 652; Kitch, supra note 9, at 685.
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that enhance Alice's general skills. Alice's marginal product during the first year
equals $30,000, which is below TrainCo's $35,000 outlay (salary plus training). In
yeartwo, thevalue ofAlice'smarginalproductrises to $35,000, exceedingTrainCo's
$30,000 salary outlay. TrainCo's total outlay of $65,000 equals Alice's total marginal
product. The problem for TrainCo is that PoachCo is willing to pay $35,000 to recruit
Alice during year two. A restrictive covenant that prevents Alice from working for
a competitor for some period following separation maybe an effective wayto protect
TrainCo's investment in trainingAlice. Numerous scholars have advocated reforming
the law to permit such restrictions.63
An elaboration on this simple story introduces a bilateral threat of opportunism.
The threat of opportunism declines when both parties have made investments that
depend on the parties' continued relationship. From the employee's side, training or
other job-specific investments that are more useful to the firm providing them than
to other firms oruses are called firm-specific human-capital investments." Familiarity
with matters such as a firm's personnel practices, transaction histories, or
manufacturing processes might be more valuable within the firm than outside. Where
there is salient risk of job loss, a worker will be reluctant to invest in firm-specific
training, knowing that it will have no value to other firms.6 The firm, too, worries
about the loss of its investment. The worker who has received firm-specific training
is more valuable to the firm than a replacement who lacks such training. In the jargon
of transaction-cost economics, specific investments create a type of ex post surplus,
or "quasi rents," that is, value that can be captured only within that relationship.'
Although the presence of quasi rents reduces the likelihood that the relationship
will break down, it does not eliminate it.' Even an employee who has invested
heavily in firm-specific skills may possess valuable industry-specific skills that he
willbe tempted to exploit elsewhere. Moreover, the parties may have a preference for
avoiding the type of costly ex post bargaining (and concomitant breakdown in the
relationship) that quasi rents create. As such, the parties may still wish to hedge
against the breakdown of the value-optimizing relationship through reputationally
enforced implicit contracts."8 They might, for example, implicitly agree to share the.
63. See, e.g., TREBILCOCK, supra note 51; Callahan, supra note 51; Faulkner, supra note
51; Edward M. Schulman, An Economic Analysis of Employee Noncompetition Agreements,
69 DENV. U. L. REv. 97 (1992).
64. BECKER, supra note 59, at 40-51 (discussing the concept of specific training).
65. Id. at 43.
66. See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 297, 298 (1978) (elaborating the concept
of quasi rents, defined as the excess of the value of an asset over its salvage value, that is, the
value of its next best use to another renter); see also, WMIUAMsON, supra note 3, at 242.
67. See WILLAMSON, supra note 3, at 243 (arguing that the unexpected severing of a
relationship in which there is asset specificity can nonetheless occur and lead to loss of value;
for this reason, organizational features must be crafted with care towards preserving these
assets); Klein et al., supra note 66, at 298.
68. The combination of implicit and explicit contracts designed to reduce transaction costs
in the employment relationship is otherwise known as an internal labor market. See Wachter
& Wright, supra note 52, at 252-53,256-57 (stating that an internal labor market contemplates
long-term relationships between the parties in which the desire to avoid disruption of the
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cost of training in the sense that the employer will pay the worker a wage that exceeds
the value of her marginal product in the training stage, yet below what the worker
could earn at another firm that offers no training. Later, the parties will share in the
return to investment: the firm will pay a wage below the worker's marginal product,
yet above her opportunity wage (because her specialized skills make her more
valuable to the firm for which she has specific training).69
Still, implicit contracting over bilateral investments may not achieve the desired
equanimity. The risk of "hold up," in which each party attempts to extract a
disproportionate share of quasi rents, remains a lurking threat for both parties.70 The
employee may demand higher wages under threat of departure, or alternatively, the
employer may reduce wages in the postinvestment period to a competitive level (for
example, by failing to increase wages with inflation).7'
One might assume that reputational incentives would stem opportunism on both
sides. A large firm might implicitly promise not to act opportunistically in dealing
with its workers, knowing that to do so would jeopardize substantial reputational
capital in the eyes of other, similarly situated workers.72 Yet, there is still room for
opportunism if the value of exploiting the right to bind the employee equals or
exceeds the present discounted value of future returns to having a good reputation.
Moreover, the modem corporation increasingly diverges from the large, stable, visible
organization envisioned by Klein, Crawford, and Alchian. The rapid structural and
identity changes that characterize many modem corporations may undermine the
effectiveness of reputation as a way to temper opportunism.73 Similarly, the threat of
lost reputational capital may have only a trivial disciplining effect on the individual
worker, whose trading partners (firms) may be dispersed, dissolved, or hampered
from exchanging information with one another, for the reasons cited above or for
other reasons.74
relationship or retaliation dampens incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior); see also
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment
Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1913, 1921-27 (1996) (describing the mechanisms by which
internal labor markets dampen incentives for opportunistic behavior).
69. BECKER, supra note 59, at 43-44.
70. See generally Klein, supra note 52.
71. Klein et al., supra note 66, at 316.
72. See Klein et al., supra note 66, at 305 (assuming adequate information about when and
how severely a contract will be broken, if the short-run gains from opportunism are inadequate
to offset the present value of foregone future returns to reputational capital, the transaction will
not occur). This also assumes the firm transacts with multiple similarly situated workers and
that there is communication among them.
73. MARGARET M. BLAiR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHNKmNG CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 259 (1995). But see Hyde, High-Velocity,
supra note 8, at 31-32, who argues that in a tight-knit regional economy such as Silicon Valley,
reputational sanctions may be quite salient. In his case study, however, Hyde argues that the
reputational sanctions may cut in the direction of disfavoring litigation to protect intellectual
property embedded in human capital, even when based on potentially legitimate claims. Id. at
32.
74. Due to the fear of liability, firms may be increasingly reluctant to provide detailed
references. See, e.g., Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, Encouraging Employers to Abandon
Their "No Comment" Policies Regarding Job References: A Reform Proposal, 53 WASH. &
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Risk aversion about the downstream division ofreturns to investment maytherefore
lead parties to enlist the further protection of explicit contracts, including restrictive
covenants, to protect their respective "shares" of the assets of the relationship.75
C. Bilateral Opportunism and Restrictive Covenants: Limits
I now take up directly the argument posited at the outset of this paper: that despite
usefulness and popularity of the transaction-cost model for analyzing the efficiency
of legal rules, it bumps up against its limitations in the area of restrictive covenants.
Seizing on the idea that restrictive covenants may be a way for parties to hedge
against opportunism by their trading partners, legal scholars have reached different
conclusions on whether the scope ofprotectible interests ought to be expanded. Paul
Rubin and Peter Shedd, for example, believe the current rules are efficient, 6 while
others, such as Michael Trebilcock, believe that the range of protectible interests
ought to include training per se.' As it happens, my criticism of the scholars'
invocation of the concept of opportunism does not turn on the resolution of this issue.
In essence, my critique is conceptually separate from the question of whether it is
efficient to enforce covenants that protect pure training.
Rubin and Shedd's well-known article was one of the first to explicitly focus on
the problemofopportunism in this context. Their original and important work helped
lay the foundation for a subsequent spate of refinements of human-capital and
transaction-cost theories to the legal doctrine of restrictive covenants. Rubin and
Shedd's argument begins with the observation that the worker will pay for only the
portion of general training that he can afford.7" Training involving trade secrets, for
example, is a type of general training that workers often cannot afford to self-finance,
and thus the only way for an employer to recapture the investment is through wage
concessions by the employee. However, once a worker receives this type of training,
he will have an incentive to breach the contract opportunistically and take his
LEE L. Rnv. 1381, 1387-88 (1996) (reviewing empirical literature showing that employers are
reluctant to provide references, or provide overly positive references, for fear of lawsuits by
former employees); Checking References ofApplicants is Risky Business but Necessary Step,
17 HUM. RESOURCES REP. (BNA) 145 (Feb. 15, 1999) (giving anecdotal accounts of employer
reluctance to give references for fear of liability for defamation or discrimination); J. Hoult
Verkerke, Legal Regulation ofEmployment Reference Practices, 65 U. Cm. L. REV. 115, 141
(1998) (mentioning employers' notorious reluctance to give candid assessments of former
employees when providing references).
75. Here, though, a familiar litany of new avenues for opportunism crops up. It may be
difficult, for example, to draft a contract that reflects all fiture contingencies. Complexity,
bounded rationality, and lack of complete information may result in explicit contracts having
inaccurate, vague, or open terms, leading to downstream opportunism in the course of parties'
attempts to fill gaps in and/or enforce the agreement. See OLVER E. WillIAMSON, MARKETS
AND HiERARCHmS: ANALYStS AND ANTTRUST IMPICATIONS 66-67 (1975); Klein, supra note
52, at 357 (stating "[t]he size of the hold up potential is a multiplicative function of two factors:
the presence of specific capital, that is, appropriable quasi-rents, and the cost of contractually
specifying and enforcing delivery of the service in question").
76. Rubin & Shedd, supra note 2, at 99.
77. TREBILCOCK, supra note 51, at 148.
78. Rubin & Shedd, supra note 2, at 96-97.
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knowledge elsewhere for financial gain. A restrictive covenant, Rubin and Shedd
argue, reduces this risk, and thereby preserves the proper ex ante incentives for the
employer to invest in research and training.79 Viewed in this light, there appears to be
a compelling case for vigorous enforcement of restrictive covenants in order to
promote socially valuable activities.
The authors point out, however, that the threat of opportunism is bilateral, and thus
an act that stems problems of opportunism for one party may exacerbate them for the
other."0 As applied to this context, a worker's human capital will typically be some
combination of general training for which he paid and other kinds of general training,
such as trade secrets, for which he did not pay. If courts always enforce restrictive
covenants, the employer may well be overprotected-an absolute injunction permits
the employer to prevent the worker from using any of his skills in the service of a
competitor, even skills he paid for himself.8 This might permit an employer to
undercompensate the employee over time, essentially holding him ransom via the
threat of enforcing the restrictive covenant.'
How, then, should courts police these bilateral incentives for opportunism?
According to Rubin and Shedd, the current judicial approach gets it right.' Trade
secrets might be seen as the paradigmatic example of general training financedbythe
employer. Therefore, courts' practice of enforcing restrictive covenants that protect
trade secrets is efficient." Similarly efficient, they argue, is enforcing covenants that
protect customer lists only where they are not generally known, and there is evidence
of effort or expenditure on the part of the employer in developing the list. This, they
say, is efficient because it likely singles out human capital paid for by the employer,
rather than by the employee.85 Rubin and Shedd acknowledge that their examples are
nonexhaustive. Still, they clearly endorse the law's exclusion of nonconfidential
general training from the categories of protectible interests on the basis that it
prevents employer opportunism."
While thought-provoking and initially convincing, Rubin and Shedd's analysis fails
on several grounds. First, it is not obvious that singling out employer investments in
confidential information and relationships effectively polices bilateral opportunism.
To be sure, evidence of costly investments in acquiring and maintaining the secrecy
of information may support a legal inference of trade secrets. 7 But this does not
answer the question of whether trade secrets alone are worth protecting. It does not
follow that absence of efforts to protect secrecy signals a lack of desire to protect an
underlying investment. Even assuming we could solve the classic administrative
79. Id. at 98-99.
80. Id. at 99.
81. Id. at 97-98.
82. Id. at 101-02.
83. Id. at 103-07.
84. Id. at 105-07.
85. Id. at 104.
86. Id. at 107.
87. Professor Kitch speculates that in the case of covenants prohibiting postemployment
use of trade secrets, the requirement of evidence of employer investment in secrecy can be
rationalized as a surrogate for a visible symbol informing employees of the intention that the
information be kept secret. Kitch, supra note 9, at 698-99.
[Vol. 76:49
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
problem of distinguishing between trade secrets and general "tools of the trade,"88
limiting protectible interests to the former may be an underinclusive rule.
Consider as an example the contract held unenforceable in the Indiana case of
Brunner v. HandIndustries.9 When the employee, Brunner, began his employment
with Hand Industries, he signed an agreement promising to reimburse the employer
for training in the trade of polishing and inspecting orthopedic products should he go
to work for a competitor within three years of commencing employment'° The
amount owing in the event of premature departure was subject to a graduated price
schedule." Two years and fourmonths after commencing employment, Brunnerwent
to work forHand's competitor.' In accordance with the price schedule, the trial court
awarded the employer $20,000, an award the Third District Court of Appeals of
Indiana overturned.93
The court of appeals might have reached its decision for a number of reasons. For
example, the court might have concluded that the price charged for the training was
unreasonable, and if accompanied by irregularities in the formation process, might
have concluded that the contract was unconscionable. The court, however, made no
inquiry into the actual cost of training, nor into the contract formation process.
Another possibility would be to scrutinize the quite peculiar price schedule. One
might predict that a price schedule of this nature would peak in the beginning, when
the cost of training exceeded the worker's marginal product, and then taper off over
time as the intensity of training diminished and the employee's productivity gradually
increased. Instead, the price schedule increased steadily for the first two years from
$2200 to $20,000, stayed at $20,000 during the third year, and then dropped abruptly
to zero upon arrival of the third year.94 The court therefore might have identified this
as a penalty clause, rather than an enforceable liquidated damages clause designed to
approximate actual cost of training. But the court did not take this approach either.
The court did say it was influenced by the fact that if the covenant were enforced, the
employee would be liable for an amount that exceeded the sum total of the wages
earned while working for the former employer.95 However, high training costs, even
when they exceed wages, do not unto themselves indicate sharp practices. On the
contrary, for some jobs, the actual cost of training may be very high and might well
exceed the total wage of the worker in the early years of employment. Indeed, this
would be the very case in which the employee could not afford to pay for training
which might later prove'marketable, thus inducing the employer to seek protection of
its investment through contract.
88. Blake's classic article pointed out the central problem of distinguishing between trade
secrets or confidential information embodied in human capital and an employee's
nonconfidential training: "In modem laboratories, design centers, and planning conferences,
where do trade secrets begin and the employee's intellectual tools of the trade end?" Blake,
supra note 20, at 668.
89. 603 N.E.2d 157 (Ind. CL App. 1992).
90. Id. at 158-59.
91. Id. at 159.
92. Id. at 158-59.
93. Id. at 159.
94. Id. at 158-59.
95. Id. at 160-61.
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In the end, the Indiana Court of Appeals's ruling inBrunner turned on the fact that
the record contained no evidence that Brunner possessed confidential information,
customer lists, or trade secrets.' In the absence of such evidence, enforcing the
contract would contravene a long line of Indiana cases categorically holding that
general knowledge, information, or skills gained by the employee in the course of his
employment are not protectible through restrictive covenant."
Cases like Brunner belie Rubin and Shedd's assumption that the common law is
efficient because the courts selectively enforce covenants where the employer has
paid for the investment. The class of "legitimate interests" recognized by the law of
restrictive covenants is underinclusive because it ignores training investments of the
sort made by Hand Industries. Absent the ability to protect these investments (as
Hand Industries mistakenly believed it could), firms may think twice before making
such substantial outlays in on-the-job general training.
It may wellbe, though, that investments of the sort made by Hand Industries are the
exception. Perhaps the vast majority of employer investments do in fact fall within
the range of interests currently deemed legitimate under the law of restrictive
covenants. Even assuming this is so, it raises the question of whether courts ought to
single out the types of investments they currently protect. Reliance on the fact of
certain kinds of investments overlooks the possibility that behavior is endogenous to
the existing rule, efficient or otherwise. In other words, employers familiar with a
century of common law jurisprudence know that courts will enforce covenants
protecting employers' investments in trade secrets, confidential information, and
nonpublicly available customer lists and relationships, but will presumptively
invalidate covenants that protect even very costly investments in human capital
deemed general tools of the trade. One would predict that, over time, investment
decisions will shift to reflect the contours of the legal rule. Specifically, one would
expect that training will be externalized, that is, workers will be required to self-
finance general training by attending college or trade-school programs.
Suppose that, contrary to the current rule, investments in general, nonconfidential
training were protectible. We might expect a change in investment strategies: we
might see more investment in on-the-job training, apprenticeship programs, and the
like. I am not aware of any convincing empirical evidence from states that have
experimented with expanding the law of restrictive covenants to protect investments
in nonconfidential general training. Nor can I assert definitively that the hypothesized
shift in the rule would lead to an optimal investment regime. My point for the moment
is simply that Rubin and Shedd's analysis falls prey to the circularity of its assertion
that the common law is efficient because it protects investments made in the shadow
of a rule that likely induces those investments.
Before considering what rule might lead to a better human-capital investment
regime-and whether the law of restrictive covenants even has a role to play in that
regard-let me raise one further limitation of the transaction-cost economics concept
of bilateral opportunism as a heuristic in this context. Although it may be correct that
workers will typically pay for general training that they can afford in the form of
reduced wages, the dynamic nature of this process may be exceedingly difficult to




capture in a legal rule. Rubin and Shedd argue that invalidating covenants that restrict
an employee from using general, nonconfidential training efficiently curbs perverse
employer incentives "to restrain such an employee from competition in order to
reduce his wages after the training has occurred.""g The problem with this statement
is that it assumes employees pay for their training only during the period of training.
As explained in Part IV.B., however, it is quite plausible that the "pay-back" period,
when the worker's wage is depressed relative to his marginalproduct, will occur after
training is complete. During this period, the threat of opportunistic employee
defection is still quite salient.
In light of this dynamic story, if the goal of an optimal rule is to police bilateral
opportunism, the relevant question is not simply whether the employer made a costly
investment in training (confidential or otherwise). The question is whether one party
has appropriated some of the value of the training without paying for it. Perhaps the
worker will choose to depart when she has worked at reduced wages only long
enough to payback half of the value of the training she received. Perhaps, though, the
worker will have compensated the employer fully for its initial investment, and
allowing the worker to depart will preclude opportunistic attempts by the employer
to continue paying wages below the worker's marginal product. Rubin and Shedd's
attempt to vindicate existing doctrinal categories fails to capture these nuances.
To illustrate, let's return to our example in which TrainCo hires Alice at $30,000
per year for two years. Recall that in the first year of employment, TrainCo invested
$5000 in training Alice, although Alice's marginal product was equal to only $30,000
that year. In year two, Alice's marginal productjumped to $35,000, yet TrainCo held
her salary at $30,000. In the aggregate, Alice's marginal product was equal to
Trainco's outlay of $65,000 in salary and training investments. In order to prevent
Alice's defection in year two, TrainCo asked Alice to sign a restrictive covenant in
which she promised not to work for any local competitors for one year following
departure. In a dynamic story, the timing of Alice's departure is critical to whether
she appropriates training for which she did not pay. If she departs at the end of year
one, she will appropriate $5000 worth of training. If she departs at the end of year
two, she will have fully reimbursed the employer for the value of her training and
appropriate nothing for which she has not paid. If she departs after eighteen months
(assuming, for sake of simplicity, that the "pay-back" process in year two is linear),
she will appropriate $2500 of the value of training.
In sum, the existing rule, which is static in its application, does not ensure that the
worker departs only with training for which she has paid.
Trebilcock's edifying analysis avoids core pitfalls in Rubin and Shedd's model:
it does not assume that it is singularly efficient to enforce covenants that
protect investments in trade secrets, customer lists, and high-investment customer
relationships. Trebilcock would presume a protectible interest where the employee
has had access to the "employer's trade secrets, specialized know-how or customer
connections."" Where a restrictive covenant appears to restrict competition per se,
however, Trebilcock would permit a former employee to exploit innate talents or
98. Rubin & Shedd, supra note 2, at 107.
99. TREBILCOCK, supra note 51, at 147.
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skills acquired on-the-job, even at the expense of the former employer ® More
specifically, the test for a protectible interest would be: "[H]ave the post-termination
activities of the employee reduced the value of his former employer's investments in
innovations or customer connections, which reduction in value would not have
occurred but for the employee's prior access to these innovations or customer
connections, and the [has] reduction in value significantly exceed[ed] that likely to
be associated with the activities of other rivals (and their employees) in the market
in question?"''
At the same time, Trebilcock would discourage categorical invalidation of
covenants designed to protect up-front investments in "garden-variety" training,
advocating instead a case-by-case, fact-specific judicial inquiry designed to gauge
whether the employer has failed to recoup an investment in human capital. He notes
that, in some cases, divergence between the marginal product and training costs in
early time periods will be so clear that a court could enforce the covenant with
confidence that the employer has yet to recoup the investment.'" As countervailing
protection for employees, Trebilcock would weaken the presumption in favor of
injunctive relief, favoring liability rules (damages) instead. Employers seeking to
enforce a restrictive covenant to protect training costs would bear the burden of
demonstrating early investments in the employee that exceeded the value of the
employee's marginal product, and which were not recouped in later time periods.
0 3
Trebilcock's solution of requiring courts to compare the value of up-front
investments in training with the value of the worker's marginal product both during
and after training may well be the optimal rule in a first-best world. In the world of
the second-best, however, Trebilcock's sophisticated approach confronts intractable
problems of its own. To truly get to the heart of opportunism, the court would need
to undertake an extensive inquiry. Evaluating the market wage for workers in the
trade in question during the period of skill acquisition, as well as the market wage
following skill acquisition, would only be the first step. Answering the question of
exactly when the employer has recouped its investments requires determining the
worker's actual productive contribution to the firm and the precise market value of
100. Id. at 147.
101. Id. at 147-48. Trebilcock assumes that if the market is workably competitive,
restrictions on postemployment competition will have a trivial effect on the market in question,
and the case for enforcement is weak.
102. Id. at 148.
103. Id. at 149. More generally, where it is ambiguous whether customerrelations and other
informational assets constitute a protectible interest, the employer would bear the burden of
quantifying damages caused by the competing former employee in excess of the competitive
threat already presented by business rivals. Id. Even where the existence of a protectible
interest is unambiguous, Trebilcock would relax the presumption of injunctive relief, shifting
to a liability rule where, prima facie, the costs imposed on the employee by the injunction
outweigh the likely benefits of enforcement to the employer. Here, too, the employer would
bear the burden ofproving its actual damages, which, once determined, would essentially serve
as a judicially-facilitated "buy-out" option for the employee. Trebilcock assumes that this
method would get around some of the difficulties parties may have in striking Coasean bargains
on their own. Id. at 150.
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that contribution.' Further, the judge would need to weigh inevitable idiosyncrasies
in the talents, capacities, and efforts of that individual employee relative to others in
the trade, and decide how those differences ought to affect the detennination of when
the employee has paid the employer back for its investment. Valuation of training
would be complicated as well. The judge would need to determine the nature and
degree of training, and its value in excess of other forms of on-the-job training that
the contract is not intended to protect. These are only some of the difficult empirical
and conceptual questions that would plague the inquiry.
My point is not that we ought to go back to the drawing board to craft a still more
sensitive test. Trebilcock's analysis raises the right questions. The problem is, the
questions maybe unanswerable. So long as the core theoretical problem is how best
to solve problems of bilateral opportunism, even the most tailored approach will need
to surmount technical and conceptual challenges that may be so formidable as to
make the rule essentially impossible to administer."
V. CONCLUSION
Despite my critical appraisal, this Article is not intended as an indictment of
transaction-cost economics in general, nor even the more specific concept of
opportunism. On the contrary, both offer useful normative frameworks for conceiving
the law. Nonetheless, I have tried to illustrate some hazards of applying this popular
model to more practical enterprises, such as explaining the existing law of restrictive
covenants or prescribing implementable reforms. I am persuaded that transaction
costs plague long-term contracting, and in particular, that the costs of bilateral
opportunism are significant in the realm of restrictive covenants. However, selective
enforcement of covenants based on either overly-crude surrogates for opportunistic
appropriation, or exceedingly fme-grained assessments of firms' and workers'
relative investments in human capital, may be very difficult to apply meaningfully in
practice.
None of this is to say that it would be futile to continue exploring optimal contract
104. Researchers have only recently begun to tackle the difficult methodological problem
of testing the training-wage hypothesis, with mixed results. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Veum,
Training, Wages, and the Human CapitalModel, 65 S. ECoN. J. 526,533-36 (1999) (showing
that data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth reflects an inverse relationship
between formal initial training and starting wage, as predicted by the human-capital model).
But see Daniel Parent, Wages and Mobility: The Impact of Employer-Provided Training, 17
J. LAB. EcON. 298,309-13 (1999) (using the same data set, finding that the inverse correlation
exists only for very early training; there is no evidence that wages are reduced while workers
are being trained in later years).
105. Trebilcock acknowledges these difficulties, but argues that unless courts "engage in
these kinds of inquiries, then they are driven back to the elusive and at least as indeterminate
distinctions between personal skills of the employee and specialized employer know-how, and
between personal skills and customer connections." TREBILCOCK, supra note 51, at 139. My
point of departure with Trebilcock is on the question of whether rejecting his technically
demanding rule renders the existing rule the only viable alternative. As I will discuss
momentarily, I believe there are still other approaches worth exploring.
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design using insights from transaction-cost analysis,'" but so doing requires that we
be mindful of these practical constraints. Accordingly, I will conclude this essay by
offering some conjectures on how we might proceed within such constraints.
Perhaps the most basic question to ask is a doctrinal one: are property and tort more
fruitful venues than contract for identifying an efficient rule to mediate innovation
and training in the employment context? Earlier in this essay, I briefly discussed the
principal property-like approach for protecting workplace investments--the law of
trade secrets. There is extensive literature analyzing the economics of property rights
to information in the employment setting, only some of which I have cited in this
Article. Although delving into the thicket of such an analysis is beyond the scope of
this short Article, it is far from clear that such inquiry would bear fruit. Recall, from
the discussion earlier in this Article, that one reason for employing restrictive
covenants in the first place is because of the functional lack of reliability of
traditional property and tort-based regulations manifested in the law of trade
secrets."10 Indeed, one recent scholar's exhaustive and critical economic analysis of
the "muddle" of trade secret law led him to advocate moving away from property and
tort rules in favor of contract principles.'0" Thus, notwithstanding the considerable
limitations of contractual devices I have described in this essay, they may be less
flawed than property rules in the realm of trade secrets and other investments in
information and training.
Is it possible, then, to devise administrable contract rules that mediate opportunism
and encourage investment in human capital? At least on the first cut, the analysis in
this Article implies that a categorical rule of enforcement would be preferable to a
more nuanced standard. For the reasons discussed earlier, applying a discretionary
rule depending on which party has paid for an investment in human capital would
demand difficult empirical judgments that may exceed the capacity ofjudges, leading
to ex post errors and ex ante uncertainty as to which investments are protectible.'19
106. In the context of collective bargaining law, for example, some scholars have fruitfully
applied transaction-cost analysis to defend imposition of penalties on parties who act
strategicallyto appropriate rents from joint surplus. Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, in whose honor this
symposium is held, has argued persuasively that collective bargaining rules on bargaining in
good faith should be strictly enforced if we believe that the NLRA is in large part designed to
regulate wasteful strategic rent-seeking between parties. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A
Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search for Bargaining Equity and
Industrial Peace, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 419, 498-99 (1990). Although this makes good sense in
the context of the more ritual, formalized bargaining process we expect under the NLRA, the
question of what constitutes bad faith may prove more elusive in the present context.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 9-16.
108. See generally Robert G. Bone, A New Look at TradeSecret Law: Doctrine in Search
of a,Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 304 (1998) ("Focusing on contract principles will
direct courts toward the proper issues and away from open-ended inquiries into poorly defined
standards of commercial morality. Intellectual property will be the better for the change.").
109. I should note that a rule requiring analysis that exceeds judges' competency is not
necessarily bad. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of
Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 159 (1994). Hadfield argues that in the area of
contracts in which mutuality is satisfied by an obligation of "good faith," such as long-term
requirements or supply contracts, a standard maybe preferable to a bright-line rule even though
it may be beyond some judges' competence to apply a standard assessing good faith and fair
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One obvious possibility would be to enforce all covenants (save those rendered
unenforceable by conventional contract rules, such as unconscionability and duress).
This, as noted earlier, is popular with several law and economics scholars who have
written in this field."'
Here, however, I return to the litany of hazards that arise in the drafting,
monitoring, and enforcement of covenants designed to anticipate future contingencies
with respect to parties' joint human-capital investments."' While the problems
summarized here might be said to afflict all manner of contracts to some degree, the
difficulties are likely to be particularly acute in the context of restrictive covenants,
given the long-term nature of such terms, and the imprecise nature of the investments
made by parties over time. Uncertainty about the future of the parties' dealings and
market conditions may make negotiations costly. Avoiding these initial costs by
devising a standard-formcontract may insteadresult in downstreamcosts because the
terms prove to be ill suited to the parties' (often heterogeneous) circumstances.' 2
Monitoring the contract downstream may also prove difficult for the reasons Rubin
and Shedd described: firms maybe able to prevent employees from using the portion
of their skills that theypaid for themselves, or undercompensate workers who initially
underestimated the value of their downstream marginal product and whose
alternatives are now constrained by the employer's injunctive power."'
Enforcement raises furtherproblems. In the presence ofjudicial error (which seems
likely in complex and heterogeneous employment environments) the procedure for
issuing an injunction, the usual remedy for breach of covenant, can be exploited by
firms for strategic purposes, adding to the usual costs of litigation."' Rational
dealing. Id. at 163-64. The reason is that bright-line rules will lead potential defendants to
overcomply with the established categorical rule, and the costs of overcompliance may
outweigh the costs of undercompliance that would occur in absence ofjudicial enforcement.
Id. at 164.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 51-58.
11. See supra note 75 (discussing various avenues for opportunism in the drafting and
enforcement of long-term contracts).
112. Mark Romaniuk, an attorneywith the Indianapolis law firm of McHale, Cook& Welch,
in his commentary on my paper at this Symposium, also described the following practice used
by some firms. When an employee commences employment, the employee signs an off-the-rack
covenant that would likely be deemed overbroad if tested in court. Upon separation, the
employer gives the employee a letter modifying the covenant so that it is more narrowly
tailored to the particular employee's appropriable skills and the scope of the external market
for those skills. In this way, the employer reduces the likelihood that the covenant will be
invalidated if enforced. If the employee lacks information about the law or is unable to predict
the circumstances of his departure, he may not have adjusted his wage demands to offset the
overbroad covenant, and during the time of employment, may have operated under the belief
that his freedom to seek alternative employment was more constrained than it actually was.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
114. See Terry R Boesch, WHat's Really at Issue in Restrictive Covenant Litigation: A
Commentary Inspired by Staidi, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 439, 439-42 (1998)
(arguing that employers may use the procedural devices associated with an injunction in a
strategic fashion; for example, using an ex parte restraining order to restrict an employee's
mobility pending consideration of the request for a permanent injunction, during which time
the employee may suffer reputational losses).
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Coasean bargaining may be thwarted if employment separation is acrimonious or if
the employer wants to cultivate a reputation as a tough enforcer in the eyes of other
current and potential defectors. "5 Damages pose difficulties of their own. Liquidated-
damages clauses run the risk of invalidation as penalties given the wide range of
circumstances that could lead to breach. Ex post determination of appropriate
remedies poses the challenge of measuring the actual damages resulting from the
employee's postemployment activities.
In sum, notwithstanding that an enforceable commitment device has the potential
virtue of allowing parties to make socially valuable ex ante investment decisions, I
am ultimately quite persuaded by Rubin and Shedd, Trebilcock, and others that the
range and severity of transaction costs would pose formidable barriers to optimal
contracting betweenthe parties. One question, then, is whether this conclusionpushes
my analysis full-circle, back to the very solutions I criticized in Part IV. I do not
believe so.
Another categorical rule would take the opposite approach: prohibiting
enforcement of restrictive covenants across-the-board (or at least prohibiting any
covenants that expand employer protection beyond that already afforded by trade
secret law). This is the approach in California." 6 Some legal scholars have recently
argued that the success of Silicon Valley compared with other high-technology
industrial districts may be attributable in significant measure to California's weak
restrictions on postemployment competition."' The argument is that "high-velocity"
labor markets, in which employees move fluidly between firms taking ideas and
innovations with them, permit the rapid diffusion of information, creating joint
technological gains that would be unattainable in a regime favoring strong
enforcement of intellectual-property rights."' Moreover, firms appear to limit their
exercise of even those legal rights available to them under trade secret law, whether
because of California juries' reluctance to convict defendants except in the most
clear-cut cases, or due to the reputational costs of bucking norms that tolerate
employee mobility (norms that may have emerged as a result of the background rules
pertaining to covenants)." 9
I find these explanations of the remarkable success of Silicon Valley plausible, and
at least partially persuasive. Although Hyde and Gilson's accounts speak .more
directly to the context of inventions and secrets, they are relevant also in the context
of "garden-variety" training. Still, it remains difficult to generalize with certainty as
to whether other state or regional economies would flourish under similar regimes of
weak intellectual-property rights. 2 ° Anecdotal evidence suggests that the poaching
115. See TREBE.cOCK, supra note 51, at 141-42.
116. See supra note 20. California's statute does not expressly exempt restrictive covenants
that protect trade secrets, but courts have interpreted it as leaving room for such contracts. See,
e.g., Scott v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1034, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
(acknowledging judicial recognition in California of an exception to the prohibition on
enforcement of restrictive covenants where trade secrets are being protected).
117. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 8; Hyde, High-Velocity, supra note 8; Hyde, Wealth, supra
note 8.
118. Gilson, supra note 8, at 608-09; Hyde, High-Velocity, supra note 8, at 29.
119. Gilson, supra note 8, at 600-01; Hyde, High-Velocity, supra note 8, at 31-32.
120. Gilson, supra note 8, at 627-29 (cautioning that the success of the Silicon Valley
[Vol. 76:49
RESTRICTIVE CO VENANTS
of valuable employees is seen by at least some employers as a rising and troubling
menace in the current economy. 2 ' Firms' perceptions (or the reality) that employees
are becoming more mobile and that firms cannot count on returns to investment in
human capital may undermine their incentive to invest in training." Firms' belief that
they are losing human capital to poachers, of course, does not mean that they are in
fact receiving suboptimal returns to their investments. They may simply lack
information about their actual net returns to human capital,'2 or the market for skilled
labor may be in a state of disequilibrium that, over time, will evolve: all firms may
become both trainers and poachers, and this kind of cooperation, however uneasy at
first, may enhance aggregate efficiency in the long run. '24
I strongly suspect, however, that there is a nontrivial subclass of situations where
employers would inefficiently underinvest in their employees absent some form of
protection. If this conjecture were borne out empirically, I would share with a handful
of other commentators some optimism about a hybrid approach in which restrictive
covenants are deemed unenforceable by statute, with an explicit exception made for
discrete training repayment contracts."z Colorado statutory law permits employers to
experience may depend on the characteristics ofregional industrial infrastructure); Hyde, High-
Velocity, supra note 8, at 33-37 (recommending additional empirical research on the
generalizability of the Silicon Valley phenomenon).
121. See CAPPELU, supra note 6, at 182-87, 198-200. Cappelli speculates that firms are
reducing investments in training employees because poaching has become increasingly
prevalent in American industry. He gives as examples: Ernst & Young's poaching a team of
ninety employees from Coopers & Lybrand and the German electronics firm Siemans, which
set up a high training-investment firm in the U.S., only to conclude that it had become the
training outfit for local companies, and subsequently changed its strategy to providing less-
extensive training.
122. See Anthony P. Carnevale & Donna Desrochers, Training in the Dilbert Economy, 53
TRAINING & DEv. 32, 34 (1999) (noting that opportunities for lifelong learning within a
particular firm are declining); Laura Dresser & Joel Rogers, Sectoral Strategies of Labor
Market Reform: Emerging Evidence from the U.S., in VOCATIONAL AND ADULT EDUCATION
IN EUROPE 269, 278 (Fons van Wieringen ed., 1999) (describing the classic prisoners' dilemma
whereby individually rational firms, each fearing that others will free ride on their efforts, will
collectively underinvest in training). But see Margaret Olesen, What Makes Employees Stay?,
53 TRAINING & DEV. 48 (1999) (arguing that training can be a retention strategy).
123. See Laurie J. Bassi et al., Measuring Corporate Investments in Human Capital, in THE
NEW RELATIONSHIP: HUMAN CAPrrAL IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION 368-70 (Margaret M.
Blair & Thomas A. Kochan eds., 2000) (suggesting that the market systematically
undersupplies information about the returns to human-capital investments).
124. Some scholars also suggest that firms may formalize the sharing of human-capital
investments through training consortia. See Peter Cappelli, A Market-Driven Approach to
Retaining Talent, 78 HARv. Bus. REv. 103, 111 (2000) (describing U.S. examples of private-
training consortia); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and
Technology: Implications for Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. L.J. 1, 18-20 (2001)
(advocating government-supported multiemployer training programs, financed by a payroll tax,
that would coordinate employees' careers among multiple employers while also solving the
collective action problem that creates disincentives to train a mobile workforce); Dresser &
Rogers, supra note 116, at 278 (describing public and private training consortia in Europe).
125. For thorough and thoughtful discussions advocating models in this vein, see O'Malley,
supra note 8, at 1233-39; Schulman, supra note 63, at 120.
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enforce contracts requiring employees of less than two years' tenure to repay
education and training expenses. 26 A statute of this sort could also contain a
provision allowing contractual arrangements specifying the discrete terms of access
to clients, again, with limitations on duration. The advantage of moving towards
statutory codification ofa training-repayment contract exception is that it would more
explicitly delineate the existing safe haven that purportedly, but inconsistently,
currently exists for these agreements.'27 Ideally, the statute would require parties to
identify clearly, in express contractual terms, the specific cost of training and the
duration-perhaps subject to a statutory cap. Should an employee depart before
completing the required service, he would be required to pay the employer reasonable
liquidated damages.
Ofcourse, some of the problems associated with contingent contracting would exist
here just as in a regime that enforced all restrictive covenants. However, such
problems would be attenuated in this context because the contracts would be shorter-
term, with more discrete, measurable consideration. The task of enforcement would
therefore be much simpler, and less subject to evidentiary ambiguity, than for a more
finely crafted remedy that (for example) attempted to determine damages caused by
actual competition. Certainly, such contracts could cover only a limited range of the
training thatoccurs on thejob."2 ' Despite these limitations, I believe this approach can
marshall some useful insights from transaction-cost economics while avoiding the
hazards that make more complex approaches alluring, but ultimately unachievable.
126. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-1.13(2)(c) (West 1994). Note that the Colorado statute
contains a limited number of other exceptions as well, including restrictive covenants executed
as part of the sale of a business and covenants that protect trade secrets. Id. § 8-2-I 13(2)(a)-(b).
These exceptions also exist in California statutory and judicial law.
127. For a discussion of the courts' inconsistent approach to enforcing agreements that
protect training costs, see supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
128. In a forthcoming article, Eric Talley and I attempt to develop a model for how courts
might adjudicate disputes involving mutual investments in less readily quantifiable kinds of
information and training, such as trade secrets. We argue for relatively weak entitlements,
favoring liability over property rules in most instances. See GILLIAN LESTER & ERic TALLEY,
TRADE SECRETS AND MUTUAL INVESTMENTS (Univ. S. Cal. Law Sch., Olin Working Paper,
forthcoming 2001).
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